











































The attached material is posted on regulation2point0.org with permission. Policy Briefing: Are Delays to the Foreclosure Process a Good 
Thing? 
by Charles Calomiris and Eric Higgins
1
Introduction   
 
The United States faces a foreclosure crisis. The Mortgage Bankers Association reported that 
slightly more than four percent of the loans in the United States are in the foreclosure process as of 
the third quarter of 2010. RealtyTrac reported in January 2011 that nearly three million homes 
received foreclosure filings in 2010. In addition to the current foreclosures, there exist a substantial 
number of potential foreclosures that will occur in the next several years. Goodman (2010) estimates 
that there may be another seven million homes that will face foreclosure. CoreLogic estimated that 
nearly 23 percent of all mortgages are underwater as of the third quarter of 2010. This number 
spikes in the areas hardest hit by the mortgage crisis. The sheer volume of actual and pending 
foreclosures coupled with a slowdown in the foreclosure process to due legal and political wrangling 
has increased the time that a home is in foreclosure. 
The purpose of this policy briefing is to analyze the economics of delaying the resolution of 
the foreclosure process. We review the literature relating to the macroeconomic effects of delaying 
foreclosures. We begin by identifying four types of potential costs of delay. First, foreclosure delays 
inject  uncertainty in the consumer balance sheet, which leads to unnecessary and economically 
damaging delays in consumption. This reverse-stimulus alone could dwarf any further plausible price 
effects of delaying foreclosures at this stage of the business cycle. Second, delaying foreclosures could 
impede new housing construction. Housing construction is predicated upon a positive and 
consistent upward price gradient in the housing market, which will not be established until the 
market is cleared of delinquent homes. Third, and similar to a consumer’s balance sheet, delaying 
foreclosures creates uncertainty in banks’ balance sheets, potentially blocking channels of credit and 
undermining lending. Fourth, delinquent homes that are heading to foreclosure have been shown to 
aggravate neighborhood blight. 
We then present the empirical  evidence  in support of delaying foreclosure  and review 
current attempts to slow foreclosure through government action. Although there is likely a material 
price effect from foreclosure and some associated consumption-wealth effect, these are short-term 
effects that are likely to dissipate over time. If homeowners believe that home prices will rebound in 
the long term, then long-term consumption-wealth  effects are likely to be small. In contrast, 
foreclosure mitigation strategies can have adverse long-term effects on consumption and 
investment. Given where we are in the business cycle, the price effects of foreclosure have likely run 
their course; at the margin, there is little to be spared by delaying foreclosures further. Because the 
social benefit of delaying foreclosure further is likely to be second-order in magnitude, the net 
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benefits of delay are likely negative. What the housing market needs now is certainty, which will 
invigorate investment and consumption. 
Economic Costs of Delaying Foreclosure 
Cost 1: Consumer Balance-Sheet Effects 
  As the construction industry requires certainty  to spur investment, households  require 
certainty in their spending decisions. In a paper published before he was chairman of the Federal 
Reserve, Bernanke (1983a) posits that a temporary increase in uncertainty can cause a sudden drop 
in investment spending. He discusses the trade-off between the benefit of information (that is, 
knowing that an investment will bring reliable returns) and  the cost of delaying investment. 
Investors will often postpone projects at a cost to wait for a safe time to make a commitment. Using 
dynamic-inference  methodology,
2  Bernanke  shows that  even a single  unusual  event
3
Romer (1990) applies this logic to explain how uncertainty disrupted consumer spending on 
durable goods  during the Great Depression.  Among other evidence, she presents a regression 
analysis that quantifies the impact of stock market variability on a measure of durable goods 
consumption. By controlling for the wealth effect of declining stock prices, Romer finds that the 
variance in stock prices and not the actual decline was responsible for the huge drop in consumption 
and investment at the onset of the Great Depression. She estimates that a doubling of the average 
variability of the stock market depresses consumption of durable goods by about seven percent. 
  can make 
investors less certain about the nature of the market, and thus cause them to adjust their behavior 
toward a higher degree of caution. 
  Barrell, Davis and Pomerantz (2006) analyze the effect of a financial crisis on consumption. 
They demonstrate that the macroeconomic effects of a crisis are aggravated by high leverage, 
especially as an effect of a high debt-income ratio. The researchers empirically test the effects of 
financial instability on consumption in 19 OECD countries, finding that the loss to consumption 
due to financial crisis ranges from 4.5 to 9.5 percent annually. They explain that the household 
balance sheet, especially those that entail high debt-to-income ratios, is a large contributor to this 
drop in spending. Lax credit constraints will ease falls in consumption in the first year following a 
crisis, but the effects of high leverage and debt-income ratios will cause a large decline  in 
consumption in subsequent years. The researchers explain that “rapid resolution is often thought 
better than forbearance which leaves bad loans outstanding and can heighten moral hazard, 
worsening the eventual costs to the taxpayer while also slowing economic growth.” 
  In the aggregate, the literature regarding mortgage foreclosure and individual investment 
decisions points to the need for speedy resolution of the foreclosure crisis. This resolution will 
eliminate uncertainty, which should spur consumption and help fuel economic recovery.   
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Cost 2: Stalled Construction of New Homes 
Until the bottom of the housing market is reached and a consistent and reliable upward 
trajectory in housing prices is established, new housing construction will not proceed. DiPasquale 
and Wheaton (1994) explain that residential construction is a linear function of new housing prices. 
Using data from Commerce Department, Freddie Mac, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, and 
the American Housing Survey, the researchers use a two-stage least squares regression to account 
for endogeneity in the predictors of housing construction, and conclude that the industry is driven 
by changes in housing prices as opposed to price levels. 
Blackley (1999) extends this research using aggregate annual data from 1950 to 1994 on new 
housing starts in the United States. Using a two-stage least squares model, he corroborates the 
evidence that residential construction is a linear function of housing prices. He determines that in 
the long-run, new housing supply is price-elastic; an increase in housing prices will lead to an 
amplified increase in new housing starts. 
These findings are also supported by Mayer and Somerville (2000). Using data on national 
housing starts, they find that increased prices in the housing market lead to an attendant increase in 
housing stock and a large increase in housing starts. They perform a time-series regression with 
instrumental variables and an autoregressive process to account for serial correlation. Their findings 
strengthen the claims that (1) changes in housing market prices, as opposed to levels, lead to new 
construction, and (2) new housing supply is price-elastic. 
By injecting uncertainty over whether the housing market reached the bottom, delaying 
foreclosures undermines the incentives of construction companies to invest. That postponed 
investment lowers economic activity in the short run and further weakens the economic recovery 
that is underway. 
Cost 3: Bank Balance-Sheet Effect 
The economic literature also supports  the notion that delaying the foreclosure process 
impairs the ability of banks to make loans. It does so in two ways. First, delaying foreclosures 
disrupts credit markets by burdening banks’ and investors’ balance sheets with illiquidity. Second, 
heightened uncertainty is disruptive to credit markets, resulting in stalled lending growth and 
reduced economic growth. 
Bernanke (1983b) explains why a disruption in the credit markets has protracted negative 
macroeconomic effects. He cites bank disintermediation as the cause for decreased output during 
and after the Great Depression, referring to the simultaneous weakening of borrowers’ balance 
sheets and tightening of bank credit supply. He uses a simple regression analysis to show that during 
the period of 1921 until the bank holiday of March 1933, credit contraction had a large, negative, 
and statistically significant effect on output. Calomiris and Mason (2003) provide more disaggregated 
evidence from the Depression that confirms the importance of bank credit contraction for slowing 
economic growth. Importantly, in addition to his empirical analysis on the depth of the Great 
Depression, Bernanke infers that the credit effects from bank failures depend on the time it takes to 
repair disrupted channels of credit and rehabilitate insolvent debtors. Calomiris and Mason show 
that the effects of credit contraction persisted for years after the shocks of 1930-1933. Page | 4 
 
Bernanke’s hypothesis is further confirmed by Anari, Kolari, and Mason (2005). They extend 
his  research  by showing  how the slow liquidation of poor assets during the Great Depression 
exacerbated financial disintermediation,  which triggered both transitory and permanent adverse 
macroeconomic consequences. They use vector autoregression models with the amortized stock of 
failed national bank deposits as a proxy for the time required to resolve a stock of poor assets. They 
conclude that the endurance of the Great Depression into the late 1930s can in fact be explained 
largely by sluggish liquidation of distressed assets. 
Given the large number of existing foreclosures and the potential overhang of another seven 
million foreclosures, it is reasonable to argue that we are facing a situation similar to the one that 
Bernanke (1983b) discusses. We have already seen that zero interest rates and two rounds of 
quantitative easing have done little to spur lending by financial institutions. This may be due to the 
uncertainty in the value of the mortgage assets held by those financial institutions. Thus, it is 
imperative that there is quick resolution to the foreclosure crisis.  
Cost 4: Neighborhood Blight 
Vacated or abandoned houses, including foreclosed houses, have been found to aggravate 
neighborhood blight.  In contrast, houses that are either real-estate owned (REO) or bank-
repossessed will clear the market relatively quickly. A June 2010 article in American Banker quotes 
Robert Klein of Safeguard Properties on the impact of delaying foreclosures. According to Klein, 
moratoriums mean that banks cannot take back properties, leading to vacancies: “By the time the 
moratorium is over, a vacant property is worth half the price because of vandalism and 
neighborhood blight.”
4
Kobie and Lee (2010) provide empirical support for this argument. Using data from 
foreclosures in the Cleveland area, they show that the length of time that a home is in foreclosure 
has a major impact on neighboring home values. They find  that  when a home has been in 
foreclosure for more than one year, homes values in the surrounding area are impacted negatively.  
When homes are in foreclosure for less than a year, the impact on the surrounding area is negligible.  
Thus, supporting the industry viewpoint that delays in the foreclosure process lead to decreases in 
value mainly due to neglect of the foreclosed properties.   
  
Possible Benefits of Foreclosure Delays 
Policymakers and the business press share the belief that foreclosure-prevention efforts are 
needed to reverse the decline in U.S. home prices. In mid 2009, Moody’s asserted that house prices 
would continue to decline due to “the slow start to the Obama administration’s Home Affordable 
Modification Program” (HAMP).
5  HAMP was designed to help homeowners with distressed 
mortgages avoid foreclosure. But as Neil Barofsky, overseer of the Troubled Asset Relief Program, 
reported to Congress in late 2010, HAMP was making some borrowers “worse off than before they 
participated,” and not producing much more than “a parade of documentation horrors.”
6
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unfazed by this criticism, in January 2011, the Federal Housing Finance Agency announced that it 
would consider changing compensation incentives for servicers of home loans to further discourage 
foreclosures.
7
Benefit 1: Preserving Home Prices 
 The implicit assumption behind this policy is that foreclosures have a negative and 
significant  impact on home prices;  if foreclosure-prevention programs can be ramped up, the 
argument goes, home prices would reverse their decline. But is this true? The recent foreclosure 
experience suggests otherwise. 
The increasingly popular argument in favor of foreclosure delays is that they are necessary to 
maintain price stability. An implication of this argument is that foreclosed homes have negative price 
effects on the surrounding neighborhood. Although there is a negative price effect associated with 
foreclosed homes (the magnitude is in dispute), there are two important caveats to this relationship. 
First, the negative price effects are likely transitory. Second, the negative price effects are caused 
mostly by additional supply to the market, and not by the foreclosures per se.  
Hartley (2010) directly addresses the difference in mechanisms causing negative price effects. 
Using foreclosure and home sales data from Chicago between 1998 and 2008, he performs a 
regression analysis to estimate the effect of foreclosures on homes in the immediate vicinity, which 
he calls the “disamenity” effect. He concludes that an extra unit of supply in the housing market will 
cause a modest price decrease within 250 feet of just 1.6 percent in low-vacancy-rate census tracts. 
In contrast, he finds a larger disamenity effect in high-vacancy-rate census tracts. 
Calomiris, Longhofer and Miles (2011a) also find that the negative effect of housing 
foreclosures on the price of neighboring homes, though statistically significant, is small. Using a 
panel vector autoregression model of housing prices, foreclosures, and economic indicators, the 
researchers show that price shocks explain roughly 30 percent of a 20-quarter forecast variance of 
foreclosures, while in reverse the effect is much smaller: foreclosures explain only about five percent 
of the forecast variance in prices. Stated differently, declines in housing prices cause foreclosures 
much more than foreclosures cause price declines. 
Mian, Suffi, and Trebbi (2011) examine the impact of U.S. foreclosures on house prices, 
housing investment, and durable goods consumption. Using zip code-level data and accounting for 
state-to-state differences in judicial foreclosure laws, they estimate a two-stage least squares model of 
home prices. They find that a one standard deviation increase in foreclosures per homeowner is 
associated with an eight-to-twelve percent drop in house price growth in 2008 and 2009. They also 
find that an increase in foreclosures leads to a large and statistically significant decrease in 
consumption and investment. The authors attempt to address the issue of causality by using judicial 
foreclosure laws as an instrumental variable to explain variation in foreclosures. While this approach 
acknowledges that foreclosures depend on state laws, it does not fully resolve the issue of causality. 
As Calomiris, Longhofer and Miles point out, the results of Mian, Sufi and Trebbi may be driven by 
the presence of a few housing bubble states in the group of non-judicial foreclosure states. 
Furthermore, the Main, Sufi and Trebbi results do not control for the effects of macroeconomic 
shocks to both housing prices and foreclosures. The researchers concede that feedback effects 
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among consumption, investment, and housing price variables are not taken into account. They also 
concede that the delays in housing price decline created by delaying foreclosures may be transitory. 
It is often argued that higher house prices would boost consumption through a wealth 
effect. Calomiris, Longhofer and Miles (2011b) review the literature on house price wealth effects 
and find evidence for a substantial wealth effect. But those results do not imply that a transitory 
increase in house prices, resulting from a temporary reduction in supply (for example, as the result 
of delays in foreclosures), would produce a significant increase in consumption. If the transitory 
reduction in supply were predictably transitory, then it should have little effect on expectations of 
future house values, and therefore, little effect on consumption. Thus, it is likely that foreclosure 
mitigation would have a minimal positive effect on consumption through the house price wealth 
effect. 
Benefit 2: Keeping People in Their Homes 
Experience has shown that foreclosure prevention efforts are neither a necessary nor a 
sufficient condition for keeping people in their homes. Adelino, Gerardi and Willen (2009) analyzed 
early results from the recent crisis and found that about one third of delinquent homeowners “self-
cure” and eventually resume making payments (suggesting lenders would have taken losses had they 
re-negotiated), while about half of homeowners who renegotiate again become delinquent within six 
months (suggesting higher losses for lenders who renegotiate when home prices are falling).  
Moreover, the likelihood of a delinquent homeowner averting foreclosure is remarkably 
small, making programs that attempt broad mitigation mostly futile. Using transition rate data from 
the Mortgage Brokers’ Association from 2005-2009, Goodman (2010) finds that the cure rate—that 
is, the amount of loans that do not default—is almost zero percent for loans already in foreclosure, 
one percent for loans that are more than ninety days delinquent, seven percent for loans that are 
sixty days delinquent, and only 33 percent for loans that are thirty days delinquent. 
One reason why government programs to mitigate foreclosures through restructuring have 
not worked very well is the poor design of mitigation efforts, which have focused mainly on 
rescheduling payments and not on the primary drivers of default. This failure has led many to 
believe that to be effective, modification needs to include some reasonable prospect of restored 
equity position. To be sure, extending that approach beyond those in distress could lead to a moral 
hazard problem. 
For example, in Mexico in 1999, the “Punto Final” program, instituted by the government, 
responded to a five-year paralysis of credit markets with a government loss-sharing program in 
which the government agreed to bear 50 percent of the costs of writing down principal of loan 
contracts if those contractual write downs were agreed between creditors and debtors within six 
months of the propagation of the program. This was a highly successful initiative, as it encouraged 
creditors to selectively reduce debt to a sustainable level in exchange for government loss sharing. 
This program was successful because it relied upon private market decisions to target borrowers 
receiving assistance, and thus allocated funds effectively to help resolve those cases in which a 
moderate principal reduction produced a substantial increase in the probability that the restructured 
loan would be repaid. For borrowers whose high debt and low income mean that foreclosure would 
still be likely even after a substantial reduction in principal, creditors would prefer not to offer write 
downs of principal, but to proceed with liquidation of commercial assets or foreclosure. Page | 7 
 
Conclusion 
There are demonstrable advantages to the economy—via  increased investment, 
consumption, and credit supply—from resolving uncertainties in the housing market and 
encouraging housing prices to “find their bottom.” The resolution of those uncertainties, particularly 
at the current phase of the business cycle, would likely have a large net positive effect on the 
economy, even after taking into account the short-term negative effects on house prices on 
consumption. The short-term negative effects from allowing foreclosures to clear the housing 
market are likely to be small at this phase of the business cycle (given that economic recovery has 
begun, and that the recognition of losses on mortgages is already factored into expectations). A 
short-term house price decline reflecting short-term selling pressure in the market  would be 
expected to be reversed, and would therefore have little effect on household’s expected wealth, and 
thus, would have little effect on consumption. 
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